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ABSTRACT
Currency internationalization could be considered as one of the primary
facets of globalization in the modern world. Today, the US dollar accounts for
nearly eighty-five percent of all global transactions, both in trade and finance.
However, as China’s power has risen in the past few decades, many have
pondered whether the Chinese currency, the RenMinBi (RMB), can
internationalize. This study examines the literature on what components create an
international currency. Then, we examine the characteristics of China’s financial
markets and international relations to become familiar with the scholarly
discourse surrounding China’s financial markets, international influence, and
monetary stability. We then collect panel data from various sources including the
World Bank, Heritage Foundation, and IMF from 2008 to 2018 to determine
whether the RMB can internationalize. Using this data, we compose a few
separate models based on whether a country has a Bilateral Swap Agreement
(BSA) with China or if it has an RMB Clearing Center – which we consider to be
symbols of increasing RMB internationalization. We hypothesize that China may
be more likely to target higher-risk countries (i.e. more volatility, less stability) as
stepping stones towards global usage of the RMB. The results of our study display
One Belt One Road Membership to be the most impactful variable within our
equation, followed by China’s business freedom index and trade with China
divided by a certain country’s GDP. Using these findings, we offer the use of
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political analysis along with economic factors in the study of the currency
internationalization as well as describe the limitations our study struggled with. It
is hoped that this study can offer insight for currency analysts and the common
investor as to how to investigate currency internationalization and the importance
of including political insights in models of currency internationalization.
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SECTION I: A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF CURRENCY?
The US dollar has dominated global financial markets since the end of the
first world war. Data from the IMF shows the US dollar leaps and bounds ahead
of the runner-up, the Euro, in the currency composition of official foreign
exchange reserves. As of the second quarter of 2019, the US dollar composed
$6.6 trillion out of a total of $11.5 trillion in allocated foreign exchange reserves
(IMF, 2019). The dollar’s dominance is reflected in international business
transactions as well, with around $580 billion used outside of the US in 2010,
equivalent to more than 65% of all issued dollars (Goldberg, 2010). Additionally,
US dollars are part of about 90% of foreign exchange trading (XE, 2019). This
should come as no surprise – the US dollar’s widespread acceptance comes from
a variety of factors, including the hegemonic status of the United States, the
Bretton-Woods System that placed the dollar at the center of international
currency markets after World War II, and the confidence international investors
and economists place in the continuation of the US dollar as a stable international
currency. However, as in any hierarchical system, there are always challenges to
the front-runner.
The Chinese RMB or RenMinBi (RMB) has emerged in the past decade as
a potential contender to the US dollar. Along with many other countries, China
has pushed policy agendas to shrink the role of the US dollar in international
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trade. China’s leaders’ rhetoric against the US dollar describes the practice of
dollar diplomacy as “hegemonic and imperialistic” (Hendry and Doff, 2019).
Beginning in 2008, the Chinese government launched a campaign to
internationalize the RMB and to shrink its reliance on the dollar. Some of this has
been successful - as China’s economic growth continues, the use of RMB in
international business, foreign currency reserves, and debt grows with it. As of the
second quarter of 2019, Chinese RMB accounts for $217 billion of the world’s
total foreign exchange currency reserves, making it a contender reserve currency
(IMF, 2019).
The Chinese government has taken an active role in ensuring the increased
use of RMB in international transactions by encouraging debtor nations to adopt
the currency. RMB internationalization comes with a variety of benefits for
China, including protection against exchange rate risk and expansion of Chinese
economic influence around the world. But observers of international affairs have
been divided on the ability of the RMB to survive or thrive in global commerce.
Characteristics unique to the Chinese economy and monetary system, such as
capital controls, have created a unique economic system for the RMB to operate
in. These same characteristics have caused the United States to label the Chinese
government and its economic policies as “currency manipulators,” citing China’s
recent efforts to weaken the RMB’s value and to lift exports (Swanson, 2019).
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However, many are skeptical of China’s ability to internationalize the
RMB. Critics are oftentimes quick to claim that China’s lack of efficient financial
markets and liberalization efforts will hinder the RMB from going global. Even
some articles in mainstream news outlets state that China’s inability to remove
capital controls will prevent the country from internationalizing. One article from
Business Insider states that “Currencies that foreigners can save and invest
efficiently are always preferred for international transactions” (Della Rocca and
Steil 2018). Others state that China needs to open up its onshore capital markets.
Many doubt the RMB can make significant progress as an international currency
due to China’s hesitant liberalization and lack of deep and complex financial
markets.
The main objective of this article is to caution those who believe that
China’s RMB will never become an international currency due to its economic
inefficiencies. Based on the academic literature on international currencies,
China’s domestic markets and financial statecraft, and China’s presence in the
international market, we theorize that political power offers China a route to RMB
internationalization that circumvents financial liberalization. An analysis of 20082018 panel data from the World Bank, OECD, Heritage Institute, and other
sources supports this theory. We estimate binomial logit regression models of the
impacts of various measures of currency stability, financial market depth, and

5

Chinese political power on the likelihood that countries will form a clearing
center or bilateral swap agreement (BSA) with China.
Our findings suggest that while traditional economic factors do contribute
to the process of currency internationalization, variables that reflected the
influence of political power seemed to have an equal or greater impact. We find
that variables measuring political power had a significant impact on the formation
of both bilateral swap agreements and clearing centers. Particularly, variables
measuring participation in the OBOR initiative led to an increased likelihood of a
BSA forming by 75% and a clearing center forming by 16%. From these
observations, we conclude by offering an altered approach to international finance
that includes a broader and more political perspective. To discover the impact of
the variables within these categories, this study first reviews literature around
elements of the Chinese economy and international currencies to see if the two are
compatible.
Our paper proceeds as follows: In Section II, we review the literature,
where we uncover the primary characteristics of currency internationalization and
study China’s domestic financial markets and international economic doctrines.
This is followed by a brief discussion of the theory gathered from our literature
review. Section III presents the data from various sources including the World
Bank, OECD, Heritage Foundation, and others, and discusses some of the
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observations made from our summary statistics. Section IV presents our
theoretical regression and explains why a binomial logit equation was selected
and descriptions of the variables used in this study. Section V discusses the results
of our regression, as well as some of the implications of our findings. Finally,
section VI presents our conclusions and the implications of our study’s findings.
SECTION II: LITERATURE REVIEW
The studies surrounding of RMB internationalization and currency
determination address three fundamental questions. First, what are the
characteristics of a popular international currency? Second, what factors within
the Chinese economy could enhance or stagnate the progress of RMB
internationalization? Third, how does China develop its foreign policy doctrine to
influence the spread of the RMB? This study reviews the literature on these three
essential questions to uncover the key determinants of RMB reserves. This review
reveals that key concepts are the stability of currencies, the structure of domestic
financial markets, and the political power of the issuing country.
What Creates International Currency?
To start with stability, countries generally want non-volatile currencies to
hold in foreign exchange reserves. Wilson (2015) writes on the many aspects of
stability that allowed the US dollar to rise to its immense use in international trade
settlements, such as large reserves, liquidity availability, and stable interest rates.
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Wilson states that despite incidents like the 2008 global financial crisis, the use of
the dollar by foreign entities has increased to its current level of around $5 trillion
per day in foreign exchange transactions. Wilson argues that large reserves of the
US dollar around the world provide incentives for countries to prevent the dollar
from collapsing, creating a virtuous cycle that contributes to the currency’s
dominance. Li and Taube (2019) also emphasize the importance of stable interest
rates, especially in regards to trade settlements and expansion, for creating an
international currency. Finally, the liquidity of currency – a key component to its
stability - is vital in the process of becoming an international currency. The
reason, according to Wilson (2015), is that liquidity is needed to meet
international demand for trade settlement since it provides a secure way for the
currency to flow to and from a particular economy. Today, U.S. Treasury bonds
provide much of this financial stability and liquidity, though the dollar is being
challenged by several other currencies that hold many of the same traits.
The second necessary factor for the development of international currency
is the breadth and the depth of the financial industry of the issuing nation. The
U.S. dollar comes from a nation that has long had an enormous and elaborate
financial system. Wilson (2015) states that the U.S.’s expansive credit to its allies
during the first and second world wars was a catalyst for creating an elaborate
financial system. The U.S. expanded on this by allowing private financial
institutions to spread overseas and creating a central bank to be a market maker
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and provide liquidity. Deep and intricate financial systems also create network
hubs, such as New York, where not only actual capital but human capital is
exchanged as well. Meyers (2015) describes financial centers, including the semiautonomous Chinese territory of Hong Kong, as catalysts for exchanges of
information and financial knowledge. These environments allow foreign investors
to become comfortable in the domestic financial markets of the respective nation,
facilitating the internationalization of a currency as investors gain confidence.
However, some authors, such as McDowell (2019) and Cohen (2017),
argue that through financial statecraft, a country can subvert this “requirement”
and internationalize its currency without altering the dimensions of its internal
markets. McDowell describes China’s offensive and defensive strategies for such
financial statecraft, stating that RMB Bilateral Currency Swaps (BSAs), is both a
“sword and shield.” BSAs are contracts that exchange of interest and principal in
one currency for the same in another. They serve as a shield since they are
designed to promote the use of RMB as a trade settlement currency and reduce
China’s dependence on the dollar. As a sword, BSAs function as short-term
liquidity backstops outside of the IMF and World Bank for countries in difficult
financial situations. BSAs enable the Chinese government to develop allies while
undermining the US’ ability to punish foreign governments. McDowell concedes,
however, that BSAs have not been extremely successful in this regard and have
instead led to China becoming a lender of last resort for high-risk countries. The
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problems with BSAs notwithstanding, the spread of RMB clearing centers could
enable the internationalization of the RMB without China becoming a lender of
last resort (McDowell, 2019). A clearing center, or clearing bank, is an offshore
financial institution through which RMB transactions can be cleared. Clearing
centers are primarily operated by China’s five state-owned commercial banks-the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the
Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications
– each of which is granted RMB clearing permissions abroad. Additionally,
Cohen (2017) offers further insight into China’s financial statecraft strategies,
stating China utilizes “cautious financial liberalization and diplomacy” to
internationalize its currency through impressive efforts on the supply side, making
the currency available to high-risk nations. From this, we see evidence for both
BSAs and clearing centers as tools for RMB internationalization that do not
require China to alter its internal economic system.
Finally, an international currency requires a nation to have political power.
Wilson (2015) argues that the size of the US military and its leading status in
many international organizations is a key explanation as to why the US dollar
took hold as an international currency. Hofstedt (2009) also provides evidence of
a first-mover advantage in setting up international agreements or organizations,
which can increase a nation’s power and political prestige. Countries can also
gain political power through trade expansion. Li and Taube (2019) describe a
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process in which countries can gain power in a trading nation by switching from a
trade surplus to trade deficit, with the caveat that inflation and exchange rates do
not change enough to hurt confidence in the currency.
Domestic Factors Influencing RMB Internationalization
Next, what domestic factors within China influence the spread of RMB in
the international currency system? The published literature offers a few insights,
including the importance of the operational capacity of Chinese banks, China’s
domestic financial restrictiveness and regulations; and corruption within China.
To begin with the importance of operational capacity, Wu and Chen (2010)
discuss the operational performance of banks within China – with shareholding
commercial banks being a determinant to the spread of RMB into the international
monetary system, which will be discussed in more detail in the section below. Wu
and Chen describe China’s banking system as a monopoly dominated by stateowned banks (SOBs), with shareholding commercial banks (SHCBs) holding a
smaller market share, though they have enjoyed more opportunities in recent
years due to reforms. Wu and Chen’s data shows SHCBs to have lower operating
costs than SOBs, due to property rights (which reduce the need for government
coordination), the bloated size of SOBs, and the phasing out of RMB restrictions
such as capital controls and interest rates imposed on foreign banks and SHCBs.
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This has allowed SHCBs to expand its foreign exchange business and the use of
RMB into the global investment environment.
Another key domestic factors in RMB internationalization is the freedom
and complexity of Chinese financial markets. For example, Huang et al. (2013)
describe China’s rapid financial deepening since the 1970s and its growth strategy
that utilizes policy distortions to repress costs. Some of these policy distortions
include the People’s Bank of China setting key interest rates, utilizing quantitative
measures in monetary policy, and window guidance - where regulators influence
the amount and composition of bank loans by communicating directly to bank
executives. This repression, however, has not done serious damage to growth,
according to Huang et al. In fact, it is cited by the authors as a source of stability
that strays away from the market volatility of complete liberalization and allows
for the government to direct resources where they are deemed appropriate. It
could be argued that financial repression within China may signal stability to
some investors McDowell’s (2018); in other words, China’s policy distortions
may lead to a vote of confidence in the RMB as an international currency. Yet as
China continues to liberalize, these domestic capital controls could be put into
jeopardy. Zhang et al. (2019), argue that despite an improving score on OECD’s
financial restrictiveness index, China’s opening to foreign competition will invite
in more capital flows, enhancing competition but endangering the effectiveness of
the domestic capital control regime. The literature suggests that while China
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shows is well behind the U.S. in terms of financial liberalization, it is not
unreasonable to predict that the stability offered by China’s domestic capital
controls may allow the country to circumvent the need for more significant
financial liberalization.
Political Power: Foreign Policy’s Influence on RMB Internationalization
The third, and probably broadest, division of the literature reviewed relates
to the international determinants of RMB use. Stanley et al. (2018) describe
China’s gradual process of capital account liberalization along with a “closed at
home, relaxed operations abroad” capital account system that has allowed the
country to meet the qualifications for an international currency while maintaining
domestic stability. This aligns with the theories of financial statecraft formulated
by Cohen (2017) and McDowell (2019) that were described earlier in this review.
Stanley et al. also touch on the rising status of China abroad and in international
organizations, further contributing to the RMBs ability to become an international
currency.
One of the most important aspects of the adoption of RMB as an
international reserve currency is China’s outward investments. Huang and Wang
(2011) describe China as an important player in the global Outward Direct
Investment (ODI) scene, with nearly $56.5 billion of ODI in 2009, a figure that
grew at an average annual rate of 55 percent since 2003. Chinese State-Owned
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Enterprises (SOEs) dominate its ODI, with much of the investment flowing
towards the services sector (76.57%) and the primary sector (18.72%). Chinese
firms care little about the institutional risks within a host’s economy. Instead, they
seek developing economies rich in raw resources and developed countries where
China is at a comparative disadvantage. Dreger and Schüller (2017) show the
developed side of the spectrum by investigating Chinese investment in Europe,
which accounts for roughly 42 percent of China’s ODI in developed countries.
China’s strategy in Europe, according to the authors, is to access the EU’s internal
market and move up the global value chain – usually accomplished by purchasing
well-known or large European companies. The authors display similar findings to
Huang and Wang’s examination – that the debt-to-GDP ratio of a country is
irrelevant to Chinese investors, with the most important factors being the market
size of the country and its bilateral trade with China. Li and Taube (2019) also
provide evidence for the effectiveness of Chinese ODI in European countries in
RMB internationalization, with €500 million worth of RMB purchased for foreign
exchange reserves in 2018.
China has inserted itself more intensively in developing countries than
with OECD countries. Hofstedt (2009) describes China’s interactions in Africa as
extremely active and assertive. For example, China is actively engaged with many
African supranational organizations, attending international summits, pledging
$150 million for the development of a headquarters for the African Union,
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providing development aid ($1.3 billion for debt relief for twenty-seven African
countries between 2000 and 2003), and establishing “Special Economic Zones” to
facilitate trade between China and Africa with added advantages for Chinese
investors such as relaxed taxes and regulations. Perhaps most importantly, in 2008
China switched from a trade surplus with Africa to a trade deficit. As stated
before, a trade surplus transitioning into a trade deficit is one of the key factors
influencing the international spread of currency since countries are incentivized to
adopt the currency into their reserves to protect against exchange rate risk.
Finally, Li and Taube (2019) write about the One Belt; One Road (OBOR)
mission - a massive infrastructure project aiming to connect China to Europe
along the route of the old Silk Road. So far, sixty nations have joined the OBOR
project and have agreed to terms of infrastructure, industrial investment, and
financial cooperation during its development process. In regards to RMB
internationalization, the OBOR has increased the trade volumes between China
and the member countries dramatically. These increasing trade volumes,
combined with added Chinese investment, incentivize countries to adopt RMB
reserves to reduce exchange rate risk and facilitate international transactions,
according to the authors. Furthermore, the shift in China’s trade orientation
towards developing economies in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa will continue
to be facilitated by OBOR, which, as discussed earlier in Hofstedt’s work, puts
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China in a position of political power as more countries come to depend on the
success of the Chinese economy and currency.
Finally, the role of offshore financial centers, Hong Kong, in particular, is
paramount to the spread of RMB. Cheung et al. (2015) describe the first of
China’s offshore financial markets as Hong Kong, which opened RMB trading to
the world in 2004. Meyer et al. (2010) describe the significance of Hong Kong
for China and why the Special Administrative Region is so important for China’s
international capital flows. To elaborate, Hong Kong’s status as an international
networking hub with a stable rule of law and one of the highest scores of
economic freedom allow for international investors to invest in the RMB without
having to enter into the Chinese mainland’s complex and restrictive financial
structure. These RMB markets have spread across other financial centers as well,
reaching out to Singapore, Sydney, New York, London, and other nations by
2014. According to Cheung et al. (2015), these international markets help
investors become more comfortable with financial transactions done in RMB,
providing a valuable component to the process of RMB internationalization.
These offshore markets also provide liquidity, allow for companies to separate
currency risk and country risks, and allow for diversification and management
advantages – further contributing to the importance of RMB clearing centers.

Theoretical Framework
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From the literature, we can begin to unravel part of the mystery
surrounding the characteristics of currency internationalization and China’s ability
to progress in this realm. The literature as a whole exhibits three main
characteristics to an international currency. First, international currency must have
a sense of stability. Stability can come in many different forms, yet it is a key
component for investors adopting a reserve currency such as the RMB. Investors
are more likely to adopt the currency of a stable currency from a stable economy,
as a form of reserves since they see it as a reliable retainer of value. Next, the
literature suggests that an international currency’s host country must have deep,
free, and complex financial markets. These markets will allow international
currency to respond appropriately to market forces and efficiently allocate
financial resources. However, some scholars debate this – mainly with theories
that financial statecraft and policy distortions can have a large influence on
currency internationalization as well. Finally, scholars suggest that the political
power of the issuing nation is key to the spread of an international currency.
Political power can take many forms - by starting international organizations,
increasing military size and influence, and growing the trade surplus or deficit to a
point where many countries rely on the success of the issuer’s economy. While
China maintains political power as well as stability (at least in the short term), this
study aims to uncover whether China’s lack of deep and complex financial
networks in the mainland impede the RMB’s progress towards becoming an
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international currency. Since data on RMB bilateral foreign exchange reserves
and trading is not available, we will examine other features of RMB
internationalization mentioned in the literature: RMB clearing centers and
Bilateral Swap Agreements (BSAs). We theorize that with an economic stability
increase in both China and a given country, there will be an increase in the
likelihood of an RMB clearing center or BSA forming between the two countries.,
Likewise, China’s political power will increase the likelihood of such institutions
forming. However, we question to what degree the breadth and depth of financial
markets will affect currency internationalization, especially in regards to China’s
internal markets.
SECTION III: CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY ISSUER:
THE DATA

Sources of the Data
This study utilizes a few sources of data from 2008 to 2018 in the
regression. Data was collected by country and year, with data on China separated
from the data for China-specific variables. First, we utilize data from the World
Bank for the inflation rate, GDP of each nation, and the percentage of stocks
traded to GDP. Next, the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development) gives us data for countries in the OECD and the OBOR (One Belt;
One Road) initiative (OECD 2019). Third, the UN’s Comtrade department
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provides data on China’s bilateral trade. Fourth, the American Enterprise Institute
provides data on China’s outflows of FDI. Fifth, we utilize data from Global
Capital China and McDowell’s study for RMB Bilateral Currency Swaps (BSAs)
and Clearing Centers. Sixth, the Heritage Foundations Investment, Business, and
Financial Freedom Indexes are used for both China and each country in the study.
Each of these sources gathers data on a country-to-country basis. This section of
the study will describe each of the data sources in detail and the significance of
the contents in regards to the summary statistics.
World Bank Data – Inflation, Stocks, and GDP
First, this study analyzes data from the World Bank from 2008 to 2018
tracking the inflation rates, the GDP of each nation, and the value of stocks traded
as a percent of total GDP in each country that reported to the World Bank.
Beginning with the inflation rate variables, the inflation rate of each country
(INFLATE), as well as China’s (CHNINFLATE), is a key indicator of
macroeconomic stability within the country. As stated in the theoretical
framework section and the literature review, stability is a key determinant of
whether or not a country will adopt a currency or invest in another country.
Furthermore, the internal stability of a country could influence its willingness to
adopt other international currencies into its markets. Finally, the last variable with
data from the World Bank is China’s value of stocks traded to GDP ratio. This
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variable (CHNSTOCK) aims to test the second core element of an international
currency’s success – deep, free, and complex financial markets. This variable will
help us analyze the impact of China’s financial activity on a country’s likelihood
of adopting the RMB (World Bank, 2019). World Bank GDP in constant 2010 US
dollars data was also collected to scale other variables used in this study to weigh
the impact of China’s investments and trade on a countries economy.
OECD Data
The OECD provided a list of countries participating in the One Belt; One
Road (OBOR) initiative and in the OECD itself (OECD, 2019). The OECD data
is used to create two independent dummy variables, OBOR and OECD. OBOR
takes on a value of 1 if the country was listed as a participating member in the
One Belt; One Road project in a report by the OECD (OECD, 2018). OECD
reflects whether each country is a member of the OECD (1) or not (0). With these
two variables, we can analyze both the impact of China’s dual strategies for
investment in developed versus developing countries and if the One Belt; One
Road initiative has a significant impact on RMB internationalization.
UN Comtrade
Data from the UN’s Comtrade department measures bilateral trade
between China and its trading partners in nominal U.S. dollars (2019). This
variable, CHINATRADEGDP, displays the trade flow between the two nations
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from 2008 to 2018. With these variables, this study can gauge the impact trade
volumes have on a country’s decision to adopt the RMB into its financial systems.
Trade volumes also reflect the elements of China’s political power in a country’s
willingness to adopt its currency. Hence, countries with higher trade volumes with
China could be more likely to adopt the RMB to protect against exchange rate risk
and ease increased transactions with Chinese counterparties.
American Enterprise Institute
Third, data on China’s outbound investments from 2008 to 2018 is
collected from the American Enterprise Institute (2019). This data includes the
investment each country receives from China in millions of dollars. The variable
(CHNINVESTGDP) is included in our model to test whether countries receiving
more Chinese ODI are more likely to conduct transactions in RMB or hold RMB
as a reserve currency. If Chinese ODI does correlate with the country to adopting
RMB into its financial transactions, this variable will signal the political power
element of RMB, derived in this case from financial dependence. If Chinese ODI
displays a negative relationship, it supports the theory that countries China invests
in may not be developed enough to engage in a BSA or RMB clearing center.
Global Capital and McDowell
The next sources of variables provide us with information on RMB
clearing centers (CLRCNTR) and Bilateral Swap Agreements (BSA). First,
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information on RMB clearing centers was gathered from Global Capital China, a
financial news website. This site provides a list of countries with RMB clearing
banks along with the date of their foundation and links to local news articles
detailing the formation of the banks (Global Capital, 2019). We transcribed this
data into two key points, the country with the clearing center and the year of the
clearing center’s formation. which will be used as our dependent variable to
represent a symptom of RMB internationalization, CLRCNTR. All countries start
as 0s in the data set until an RMB clearing center is opened within their borders,
at which point the year and following years for that country become a 1. Next,
data from McDowell’s article provides us with the participant country names and
years that RMB BSAs were formed from 2008 to 2018 (McDowell 2019). These
data serve as our second dependent variable (BSA), which will test a potential
second characteristic of RMB internationalization, Bilateral Swap Agreements.
As with the CLRCNTR variable, all countries start as 0s in the data set until a
bilateral swap agreement is created between China and the respective country, at
which point the year and following years for that country become a 1.
The Heritage Foundation
The final data source is the Heritage Foundation, which provides Business,
Investment, and Financial Freedom Indexes. These indexes incorporate measures
of the number of restrictions on components of a given country’s economy to
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produce a score from 0 (least free) to 100 (freest) (Miller et. al 2019). This study
uses three of these metrics, the Financial Freedom index
(FINANCIAL_FREEDOM and CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM), Investment
Freedom Index (INVESTMENT_FREEDOM and
CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM), and Business Freedom Index
(BUSINESS_FREEDOM and CHNBUSINESS_FREEDOM). Investment Freedom
and Financial Freedom serve to test the relationship between depth and breadth of
financial markets and the adoption of RMB. (McDowell 2019) and (Stanley et al.,
2018). Finally, Business Freedom gauges the stability of a country’s economy, as
well as China’s, based on economic theories of efficient markets. To elaborate,
Miller et al. (2019) describe how low business restrictions allow markets to
quickly adapt to new market conditions, leading to long-term stability. Our
analysis of the summary statistics below provides greater insight into how each of
the variables is used and the data observed within each variable.
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Analysis of Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Stability
INFLATE
1342
5.75
CHNINFLATE
1342
2.80
BUSINESS_FREEDOM
1342 66.06
Depth and Breadth of Financial Markets
CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM
1342 28.10
CLRCNTR
1342
.06
FINANCIAL_FREEDOM
1342 51.13
INVESTMENT_FREEDOM
1342 54.35
CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM 1342 25.90
CHNSTOCK
1342 118.77
CHNBUSINESS_FREEDOM
1342
51
Political Power
CHNINVESTGDP
1342
0.03
CHINATRADEGDP
1342
0.10
OECD
1342
0.26
OBOR
1342
0.41
BSA
1342
0.13

Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
6.93
1.89
16.44

-8.97
-0.73
20

121.74
5.92
99.9

3.92
0.25
18.24
21.98
3.55
86.05
2.57

20
0
0
0
20
17.16
46.4

30
1
90
95
30
357
54.9

0.07
0.16
0.44
0.49
0.34

0.0001
0.006
0
0
0

0.96
2.219
1
1
1

Once the summary statistics are collected from the data used in the
regression, a few observations can be made from the above table (see Table 3.1).
For context, this study uses panel data from 205 countries and regions with
available information from 2008 to 2018, resulting in 1342 observations. There
are more than the 195 sovereign countries that the UN recognizes due to the
importance of specific regions or non-recognized countries in the data. For
instance, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau play a huge rule in trade with China –
yet they are not recognized as sovereign countries by the UN. There is much
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controversy surrounding the legitimacy and sovereignty of these nations, yet this
paper is focused on tracking the economic impact of China’s currency in the
international sphere. Hence, countries and regions that contribute heavily to RMB
internationalization but have questionable sovereignty will remain in the study.
Next, we will examine the variables that measure economic
characteristics, such as inflation and stock trading activity. Beginning from the
top, the first variable, INFLATE, displays the ith countries’ level of inflation on an
annualized basis. The variable has a mean of 5.72 with a standard deviation of
6.93. This demonstrates that while there are some countries with higher levels of
inflation (i.e. countries such as Argentina or Zimbabwe) a vast majority of
countries do not go above 17% inflation. CHNINFLATE, the variable that
displays China’s level of inflation from 2008 to 2018, has remained relatively
stable during this time. With a minimum of -0.728% and a maximum of 5.92%,
China seems to have kept its inflationary volatility low the past few years.
However, with an economy as large as China’s, a few percentage points in either
direction could have a profound global impact. The next variable, CHNSTOCK,
investigates China’s financial activity from 2008 to 2018. From the data, it is
clear that China has a very large stock market in proportion to its GDP –
averaging 118% of its GDP in the value of stocks traded. However, there is a
large standard deviation to this statistic (86.047), indicating that China’s stock
activity has not been consistent during the past decade and a half. This could be

25

due to China’s low scores on the financial and investment freedom indexes,
indicating that China’s stock market activity could have been severely limited at
times due to regulations or financial restrictions.
The next category of variables uses data from the Heritage Foundation’s
Economic Freedom Index which scores countries from 0 to 100 (0 being
completely restricted; 100 being fully free) based on various metrics in different
categories ranging from investment to business freedom. This study examines
both the scores of the ith country and China to examine their significance on
whether or not a country will be more likely to adopt the RMB in the form of a
bilateral swap agreement or a clearing center. Beginning with our variable for
financial freedom, FINANCIAL_FREEDOM, the average score of 51 signifies
that many countries fall on both sides of the spectrum, as well as in the middle, of
the financial freedom index. However, China’s financial freedom
score(CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM), is consistently between 20 and 30, which
the Heritage Foundation refers to as the “repressed” zone. This seems to align
with our literature review, particularly the Stanley reading where China’s
financial restrictions and their impacts were described in detail. Next, the
variables measuring investment freedom seem to describe a similar situation. The
variable INVESTMENT_FREEDOM shows an average score of 54.31 with a large
standard deviation of 21.97, indicating there is a wide range of scores across
countries from 2008 to 2018. CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM, on the other hand,
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seems to describe a more consistent narrative, with scores remaining between 20
and 30 for the period examined. The final variables examined in this category
measure business freedom. Interestingly, the average scores, despite having a
standard deviation of 16.436, are significantly higher than the averages for
investment and financial freedom. This could be due to the effects of
globalization in the twenty-first century – as countries uncover the benefits of
foreign investment and freer economic systems in a globalized world, they may
be more likely to lessen restrictions on businesses. However, some countries still
may wish to indulge in financial protectionism to protect against foreign
influence, which may cause lower averages for financial freedom and investment
freedom around the world. China, perhaps unsurprisingly, falls below the average
with a score of 50.99 and a small standard deviation – indicating that the country
still suffers from the rigidity of regulations on investment, business, and financial
activity.
The next category of variables reflects China’s investment and trade with
certain nations. We will test whether or not these variables have a significant
association with the likelihood a country will enter into a bilateral swap
agreement or open an RMB clearing center. The first variable, CHNINVESTGDP,
takes the total foreign direct investment China sent to the ith country in a specific
year and divides it by that countries’ GDP to capture the scale of Chinese
investment in that country’s economy. From the table, countries receive an
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average of about 3.3% of their GDP in Chinese investment. There are some larger
percentages as well, including the maximum of 96.4% for Niger, which received
Chinese investment nearly equivalent to its entire GDP in 2009. The next
variable, CHINATRADEGDP, examines the amount of trade between the ith
country and China and divides this number by the ith country’s GDP. Being one
of the world’s largest exporters and one of the largest trading powers, China
trades in great quantities with many different countries. Thus, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the average country in this study trades the equivalent of 10% of
its GDP with China, displaying China’s economic might in regards to trade.
Overall, these variables display the sheer economic power China possesses,
indicating that countries more dependent on Chinese trade and investment may be
more likely to adopt processes conducive to RMB internationalization.
The final category of variables are dummy variables that reflect
participation in international organizations, or this case the One Belt One Road
Initiative (OBOR) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). OBOR measures whether a nation is involved with the
OBOR project. The mean of 0.406 indicates that many nations were involved in
the OBOR project during the study - 70 in all. OECD’s value reflects whether the
country is a member of the OECD. The average of 0.26 indicates that only a
minority of countries are in the OECD. The final two dummy variables serve as
our dependent variables, BSA and CLRCNTR. First, BSA examines whether or not
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the ith country has a bilateral currency swap with China in the year observed. As
the average indicates, most countries do not have a bilateral swap agreement,
which aligns with theories that China has a long way to go towards
internationalizing their currency. Finally, CLRCNTR examines whether or not the
ith country has an RMB clearing center, a crucial tool in the process of RMB
internationalization. However, the average shows that even fewer countries
possess one of these critical components for RMB internationalization. Again, this
reinforces the narrative that China has a long way to go in regards to convincing
countries to switch to the RMB as an international medium of exchange. With the
summary statistics summarized, we will now proceed to our theoretical model to
describe how each of these elements will be utilized to uncover some of the
determinants of RMB internationalization.
SECTION IV: THEORETICAL REGRESSION
Binary Logistic Models
We estimated two binary logistic models (see Models 1 and 2), with and
without country and time fixed effects, to measure the spread of the RMB
internationally through a variety of different elements, ranging from financial
freedoms to inflation rates. The two models have the same independent variables.
Model 1’s dependent variable is BSA, which has a value of zero for a country
without a bilateral currency swap agreement with China and a value 1 if a country
does possess such an agreement for every year after the year of inception. Model
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2’s dependent variable is CLRCNTR, which takes on a value of 1 for every year a
country possesses an RMB clearing center or 0 if it does not.
The binary logistic model was chosen since it addresses unboundedness
issues that are inherent to linear probability equations. The model is estimated
using the method of maximum likelihood method since the relationships among
the variables in the logistic models are not linear.
Model 1: BSA Model
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

Model 2: Clearing Center Model
𝐶𝐿𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

Additionally, we have estimated both of these models with and without
fixed effects by country and time. This is done to control for time-invariant
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characteristics that vary between countries and characteristics that impact all
countries equally in each period. However, future research would need to explore
further approaches to dealing with the binary outcome variable in a time-series
cross-sectional data structure. It is widely known that this data structure presents
challenges in recovering estimates especially when using fixed effects to account
for unobserved heterogeneity (see Beck et al., 1998; Beck N., 2018; Greene et al.,
2002; Kropko and Kubinec, 2020).
Dependent Variables
We chose BSA and CLRCNTR as dependent variables. We believe them to
be characteristics of RMB internationalization and other data measuring it is
difficult to obtain. To elaborate RMB currency reserves data is unavailable due to
its confidential and sensitive nature. But we consider RMB clearing centers and
bilateral currency swap agreements to be two signals of RMB internationalization.
McDowell (2018) states that “the RMB’s future as a trade settlement currency
will depend…on the spread of RMB clearing centers.” McDowell also argues in
his paper that bilateral currency swap agreements carry evidence of being
“financial statecraft” on the part of the Chinese government. While he concludes
that oftentimes these swaps are utilized by high-risk countries in a roundabout
way to get US dollars, they also display evidence of becoming an effective tool
for the internationalization of the RMB, given that China is willing to take a
lender of last resort role. There is evidence of China heading down this route,
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especially with some of its investments in high-risk areas (see Hofstedt, Huang &
Wang, and Dreger & Schüller). As for clearing centers, as stated above,
McDowell’s (2018) conclusion offers RMB clearing centers as a preferable
measure of RMB internationalization, stating that they provide an essential source
of RMB liquidity in foreign markets. With these factors considered, we believe
that tracking both the presence of clearing centers and bilateral swap agreements
accurately portrays the internationalization of RMB.
Independent Variables
In regards to our independent variables, we expect to see several
categories of relationships. Table 2.1 summarizes our hypotheses. First, if China
is heading down a lender of last resort route to RMB internationalization, we
should see some evidence of countries with weaker or riskier economies
possessing bilateral currency swap agreements (BSA) or RMB clearing centers
(CLRCNTR) with China. If this is the case, we expect to INFLATE to carry a
positive coefficient, so that countries with higher inflation rates will be more
likely to possess an RMB clearing center or BSA. However, we are unsure
whether China’s inflation rate (CHNINFLATE) will be significant to the spread of
RMB internationally, at least in regards to BSAs and RMB clearing centers. We
also believe that countries with lower scores on FINANCIAL_FREEDOM,
INVESTMENT_FREEDOM, and BUSINESS_FREEDOM will be more likely to
possess a BSA or clearing center.
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Another element of our study concerns the complexity and size of
financial markets. We believe that CHNSTOCK will carry a positive coefficient,
as it reflects the depth of China’s financial markets through the volume of stocks
traded to GDP. We also track China’s scores for business freedom, investment
freedom, and financial freedom (CHNBUSINESS_FREEDOM,
CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM, and CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM,
respectively). These serve to help us examine whether free financial markets have
a relationship with bilateral swap agreements and clearing centers. If our
hypothesis is correct, the coefficients on these variables will not be statistically
significant.
The final category of independent variables addresses the third element of
international currencies, the political power of the issuing nation. We expect
OBOR, a dummy variable representing a country’s participation in the One Belt;
One Road initiative, to be positive. Conversely, we believe that OECD,
representing whether a country is a member of the OECD, to either be
insignificant or negative since China is not a member of the OECD and may wish
to gain power relative to that prominent international organization. Additionally,
we include CHNINVESTGDP, which tracks China’s investment in the ith country
divided by the ith country’s GDP during a specific year, and CHINATRADEGDP,
which utilizes the same measurements in regards to net trade. We expect
CHINATRADEGDP to carry a positive coefficient and CHNINVESTGDP to be
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either 0 or negative. In regards to CHNINVESTGDP, Dreger and Schüller (2017)
show that China invests in places where it is at a comparative disadvantage or
investing in a low-value primary industry. From this observation, we predict that
countries with high levels of Chinese investment will either not be interested in a
BSA with China or will not have the financial capacity to enter into a BSA or
accept an RMB clearing center. On the other hand, we expect trade to have a
positive relationship with both clearing centers and BSA agreements. This is
reinforced by the findings of Li and Traube (2019), who argue that China’s
increased trade with a nation will help facilitate the spread of RMB into that
countries economy – both through exchange rate pressure and diplomatic
reasoning. With these independent variables selected, we can test our hypotheses
regarding the three major elements of international currency: stability, deep and
free financial markets, and political power.
Violations of the Classical Linear Regression Assumptions
The data employed in our model estimate could exhibit characteristics that
violate a classical linear regression model, specifically through multicollinearity,
serial correlation, and, heteroskedasticity. We considered these issues, though it is
worth noting that a binomial logit model is non-linear. First, to assess
multicollinearity, we estimated both of our models using ordinary least squares
(OLS) and calculated the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for each variable. All
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variables, except for CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM, fell under a VIF of 3.5.
CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM’s VIF of 4.12 suggests collinearity with another
variable, biasing the standard errors higher and reducing t-statistics lower. We
kept CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM in the model since our theory on the
importance of China’s internal financial market policies supports its inclusion,
and we wanted to avoid omitted variable bias that would likely result from
excluding it.
Turing to serial correlation, the nature of the data is that there is serial
correlation in the dependent variables because their values become 1 and remain 1
when a nation enters a BSA or clearing center agreement with China. The current
SAS software, however, does not have a correction for serial correlation for
binomial logistic models. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator
was considered, but time constraints prevented this advanced method from being
implemented. Lastly, in regards to heteroskedasticity - since the independent
variable only takes two values, the concept of variance is not the optimal way to
describe the dispersion of the independent variable. Because of this, we do not
test or correct for heteroskedasticity in our models.
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Table 4.1: Hypotheses and Tests
Number

Hypothesis

H1

INFLATE: Countries with higher inflation rates will
attract BSAs and clearing centers.
CHNINFLATE: As China’s inflation rate increases,
BSAs and clearing centers will become less likely to
form
CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM: As China’s financial
freedom increases, a country is more likely to have a
BSA or clearing center
FINANCIAL_FREEDOM: Countries with increased
financial freedom are less likely to enter a BSA or
clearing center.
INVESTMENT_FREEDOM: countries with higher
scores of investment freedom are less likely to have
BSAs or RMB clearing centers
CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM: As China’s
investment freedom increases, the likelihood of BSAs
and clearing centers occurring in countries will
increase
BUSINESS_FREEDOM: Countries with higher scores
in business freedom may be less likely to receive RMB
clearing centers or BSAs
CHNSTOCK: As China’s levels of stock activity
increase, it is more likely that countries will adopt
RMB through BSAs or clearing centers
CHNBUSINESS_FREEDOM: As China’s business
freedom increases, then it is more likely that countries
will adopt the RMB through clearing centers and BSAs
CHNINVESTGDP: As countries receive more
investment from China, they may be less likely to
RMB through clearing centers or BSAs
CHINATRADEGDP: countries that trade more with
China in proportion to their GDP may be more likely to
adopt the RMB through clearing centers and BSAs
OECD: Countries within the OECD will be less likely
to have clearing centers or BSAs with China

H2

H3

H4

H5

H6

H7

H8

H9

H10

H11

H12

Expected
Sign
𝛽1 > 0

Null
hypothesis
𝐵1≤ 0

𝛽2 < 0

𝛽2 ≥ 0

𝛽3 > 0

𝛽3 ≤ 0

𝛽4 < 0

𝛽4 ≥ 0

𝛽5 < 0

𝛽5 ≥ 0

𝛽6 > 0

𝛽6 ≤ 0

𝛽7 < 0

𝛽7 ≥ 0

𝛽8 > 0

𝛽8 ≤ 0

𝛽9 > 0

𝛽9 ≤ 0

𝛽10 < 0

𝛽10 ≥ 0

𝛽11> 0

𝛽11 ≤ 0

𝛽12< 0

𝛽12 ≥ 0
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H13

OBOR: countries within the OBOR project will be
more likely to have clearing centers or BSAs with
China

𝛽13 ≤ 0

𝛽13 > 0

SECTION V: REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Our estimates for all four estimated models are displayed below (Figure
3.1). In the text below, we interpret coefficients as the increase in the probability a
country will have a BSA or clearing center with China. Consistent with standard
practice (Studenmud, 2015) we divide coefficients by 4 to account for curvature
in the relationship captured by binomial logistic models. We have divided our
results into three categories based on the three major themes of international
currencies examined in this study: stability, deep and complex financial markets,
and political power.
Figure 3.1: Regression Model Estimates

Variable
INFLATE
CHNINFLATE
CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDO
M

FINANCIAL_FREEDOM **

BSA FE
(1)

BSA no
FE (2)

ClrCntr
FE (3)

Coefficie
nt
0.2869
0.5451
28.1723
0.7123

Coefficie
nt
0.037 *
0.0037
-0.0284
0.6467

Coefficie
nt
0.3779
0.6929
7.0387
0.9347

ClrCntr
no FE
(4)
Coefficie
nt
-0.00074
0.9863
0.079
0.5514

2.7376

-0.00974

1.4997

0.0513

0.929

0.8341

0.9147

0.4232

0.1325

0.0549 *

0.3105

0.0716 *
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INVESTMENT_FREEDOM
**

CHNINVESTMENT_FREE
DOM

BUSINESS_FREEDOM**

CHNSTOCK

CHNBUSINESS_FREEDOM
**

CHNINVESTGDP

CHINATRADEGDP**
OBOR **
OECD

0.7793

<.0001

0.3535

<.0001

-0.1886

-0.0535*

0.0189

-0.0313*

0.6541

<.0001

0.9686

0.0206

-3.1808

-0.00487

-1.8809

-0.0743

0.7876

0.8902

0.8349

0.1731

-0.0271

0.0683*

-0.1319

0.0685*

0.962

<.0001

0.7846

<.0001

0.0669

0.00127

0.00913

-0.0008

0.6681

0.3332

0.9691

0.6276

3.5438

0.2322*

3.2413

0.6791*

0.944

0.0001

0.8862

<.0001

33.9374

-7.4696*

-17.6069

-15.59

0.6994

0.0198

0.8971

0.1096

-38.8854
0.705
-

1.0708*
0.0198
2.8514*
<.0001
0.169
0.6411

2.3222
0.9833
-

2.8916*
0.0006
0.6448*
0.0377
0.4314
0.3092

*Denotes statistical significance of the estimate (95% confidence level)
**Denotes statistical significance of the variable for both clearing centers and bilateral swap agreements
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All variables are derived from data on 205 countries and regions with available information between 2008 and 2018,
resulting in a total of 1342 observations. Each column contains both a coefficient estimate (top) and p-value (bottom)
for the variable in question. Inflation statistics for CHNINFLATE and INFLATE are from the World Bank Databank
and are by consumer prices on an annual percentage basis. Chinatradegdp and Chninvestgdp both use UN Comtrade
data to calculate a countries trade and investment from China as a proportion of the nation’s GDP. Freedom Index
variables are calculated by the Heritage foundation across a series of metrics. More information on how these metrics
are calculated can be found here (www.heritage.org/index/explore). OBOR and OECD are dummy variables that
display a 1 for all years if a nation is a member of the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR) or Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

As displayed by our results, our regressions that account for time-invariant
country-specific effects are insignificant. Unmeasured political and cultural
factors may influence the insignificance seen in this equation. Yet, it is also
possible that omitted economic factors are also swaying the variables within the
fixed effects equations to be insignificant. Additionally, as discussed earlier, there
is a wide array of literature that argues against using fixed effects in a binary
logistic regression stating that it is ineffective towards uncovering unobserved
heterogeneity. Even so, while the inclusion of economic factors could influence
our fixed effects equations - our non-fixed effects equations show evidence that
political factors also play a strong role. For the remaining analysis below, we will
discuss the results of our regressions that do not use fixed effects – keeping in
mind the potential effects of omitted variables and the potential ineffectiveness of
the binary fixed effects equations to account for heterogeneity.
Stability
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The first component of an international currency examined in our study is
the stability of the issuing country’s economy, as well as the economies of its
partners. For this factor, we mainly used inflation indexes (INFLATE and
CHNINFLATE) to measure economic stability. Beginning from the top, we notice
that inflation (INFLATE) was positive and significant in the BSA equation yet
insignificant in the clearing center regression. This provides evidence that while
RMB bilateral currency swaps may be popular in countries with higher inflation
rates. Yet, there is a lack of evidence for a correlation between that and RMB
clearing centers. Next, China’s inflation rate (CHNINFLATE) is insignificant in
both regressions. The coefficient estimate for INFLATE, however, was of
particular interest since it is only significant in the BSA models, in which it
carries an estimated coefficient of 0.037. Here we find evidence that for every 1%
increase in inflation, there is a 0.92% increase in the likelihood that a bilateral
swap agreement with a specific country will form, all else held constant. This
aligns with McDowell’s (2019) theories of bilateral swap agreements as a
mechanism for China to become a lender of last resort for higher-risk economies.
However, the same does not apply for the formation of clearing centers which
could indicate that there are different models of financial statecraft that China
utilizes when internationalizing RMB, as discussed in McDowell’s (2018) article.
Following this reasoning, clearing centers could be indicative of China’s efforts to
internationalize the RMB in low-risk economies, whereas bilateral currency
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swaps could be used in countries that have less desirable credentials. In regards to
economic stability, the significance of the inflation rate of the ith country provides
evidence that China may be able to be selective when choosing a partner for a
clearing center or BSA.
Inflation does not capture the full scope of the economic stability of a
nation. To account for this, our regression also incorporates the Business Freedom
Index to offer insight into the stability of the business market within China and its
trading partners. Miller et al. (2019) argue that countries with higher indexes of
business freedom are more likely to operate efficiently and effectively, or are, in
other words, stable. Our regression results back up these claims. The variables
accounting for business freedom both within and outside of China
(CHNBUSINESS_FREEDOM and BUSINESS_FREEDOM, respectively) were
both found to be significant in both equations. For bilateral currency swaps, for
every 1-point increase on China’s Business Freedom index, the likelihood of a
bilateral currency swap agreement forming increased by 5.81%, which is rather
strong. On the other side, a 1-point increase in China’s Business Freedom index
increased the likelihood of a country developing an RMB clearing center by
16.98%, which is much stronger than the bilateral currency swap agreement. One
possible explanation is that partner countries are sensitive to the business
environment within China, as was discussed in Li et al. (2015) and Wu and Chen
(2010). The ith country's business freedom index (BUSINESS_FREEDOM) also
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seemed to have a slightly positive association with the creation of BSAs and
clearing centers, with a 1-point increase on the business freedom index increasing
the likelihood of a BSA or clearing center forming by 1.71% and 1.71%
respectively. Business freedom seems to have nearly the same effect on both
clearing centers and BSAs, indicating that the component may be equally
important for the formation of both.
Overall, our regression provides support to some of the theories raised in
the literature, particularly that of Stanley et al. (2018), who argued that China’s
financial strategies onshore and offshore differed greatly. These dual strategies, as
was discussed in McDowell’s (2019) article as well, allow for China to be
selective in international finance while domestic policies lower foreign investors’
sensitivity to particular economic concerns within China. However, it is important
to keep in mind that the RMB is pegged to a basket of currencies, which started in
2004 after it was pegged to the US dollar for nearly a decade. Since China does
not have a floating currency, inflationary measures may not be the best indication
of economic stability. Even so, we are offered valuable insights by the regression
in regards to China’s financial statecraft and which countries the rising power
potentially sees as targets for the international spread of RMB. Also demonstrated
is the importance of the Chinese business market in the development of RMB
clearing centers and BSAs.
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Deep and Complex Financial Markets

The next component concerns the “deepness” and the complexity of a
financial market. To briefly recap, we hypothesize that China’s financial market
characteristics will not be relevant to the international spread of RMB due to the
influence China’s financial statecraft may play in the process. To test our
hypothesis, our regression incorporates 5 separate variables
(CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM, FINANCIAL_FREEDOM,
CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM, INVESTMENT_FREEDOM, and CHNSTOCK)
to measure the effects of external and internal financial market characteristics on
the spread of RMB. In regards to China-specific variables, China’s financial
freedom score (CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM), investment freedom score
(CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM), and stock activity to GDP (CHNSTOCK) were
all found to be insignificant in both equations, according to our regressions. This
indicates that our analysis failed to provide evidence that Chinese freedom index
scores affect the adoption of RMB. While we cannot reject the possibility that
CHNFINANCIAL_FREEDOM and CHNINVESTMENT_FREEDOM have no
effect, Zhang et al. (2019) and Stanley et al. (2018), point out the stagnant
progress of financial liberalization in China for the last few years, despite China’s
and the RMB’s growing international presence. Findings within the literature
support our hypothesis and suggest that China’s strict internal financial controls
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are not impeding its external processes of RMB internationalization despite the
insignificant results in our regressions.
However, as was the case with stability, our regression provides evidence
that China is selective towards the countries it spreads to RMB too. Financial
Freedom (FINANCIAL_FREEDOM), for both clearing centers and bilateral swap
agreements, was found to be significant in all equations. The same was true for
Investment freedom (INVESTMENT_FREEDOM). As Huang & Wang (2011)
pointed out, China does identify specific characteristics when investing in certain
sectors or economies. These characteristics, which included whether China has a
comparative advantage in a certain industry and the presence of crucial resources
for China’s economic progress, could also include the economic doctrines of a
specific country as well. Additionally, both the BSA and clearing center
regressions showed evidence of INVESTMENT_FREEDOM carrying a negative
coefficient (-0.0535 and -0.0313, respectively) while FINANCIAL_FREEDOM
carried a positive coefficient (0.0549 and 0.0716, respectively). Interpreting these
coefficients, we find that holding all else constant, for every 1-point increase in
FINANCIAL_FREEDOM and INVESTMENT_FREEDOM, the likelihood that a
bilateral currency swap will form between a particular nation and China changes
by 1.37% and -1.34% respectfully. On the side of clearing centers, for every 1point increase in a FINANCIAL_FREEDOM and INVESTMENT_FREEDOM, the
likelihood that an RMB clearing center will form in a country changes by 1.79%
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and -0.78% respectively, holding all else constant. With these observations in
mind, we reexamined the source of the data to uncover how investment freedom
differed from financial freedom. Higher Investment Freedom, as described by the
source, creates “maximum entrepreneurial opportunities and incentives for
expanded economic activity, greater productivity, and job creation” and is
hindered by “restrictions on the movement of capital.” Conversely, financial
freedom deals with “the availability of diversified savings, credit, payment, and
investment services to individuals and businesses,” and is hindered by “Banking
and financial regulation by the state that goes beyond the assurance of
transparency and honesty” (Miller et al. 2020). From these findings, we discover
evidence that China may shy away from countries that have fewer restrictions on
the movement of capital but be slightly attracted to countries that have less
financial and business regulation, perhaps for the benefit of Chinese FDI.
Political power

The final element of international currencies within the regression is the
political power of the issuing nation. Beginning with our variables
CHNINVESTGDP and CHINATRADEGDP, these were designed to capture the
effects of China’s economic prowess on the internationalization of the RMB.
China’s investment as a percentage of a nation’s GDP (CHNINVESTGDP) was
significant for developing a bilateral swap agreement, yet insignificant for the
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creation of an RMB clearing center. Conversely, China’s trade as a percentage of
a nation’s GDP (CHINATRADEGDP) showed the inverse of these results, where
trade was significant to the creation of a clearing center, but insignificant to a
bilateral currency swap. The answer to why this likely is lies within the
characteristics of clearing centers and bilateral currency swaps themselves.
Bilateral swaps may be more characteristic to countries where China is hoping to
grow its influence, where clearing centers may be more likely to form in countries
whose economies have a high volume of Chinese trade. Even so, a closer
examination of the variables’ coefficients is needed to determine how certain
characteristics influence the development of RMB clearing centers and bilateral
swap agreements.
Upon closer examination, China’s investment in proportion to GDP
(CHNINVESTGDP) and China’s trade in proportion to GDP
(CHINATRADEGDP) seem to play different roles in the development of BSA and
clearing centers. In regards to BSAs, Chinese investment seems to play a more
influential role than trade. However, holding all else constant, for each percent
increase of Chinese investment in proportion to ith country's GDP, the likelihood
of a BSA forming between the two nations falls by 1.87%. A possible explanation
for why this is lies within the Dreger and Schüller (2017) article, which explained
that China tends to invest in areas where it does not have a comparative
advantage. Since it has already been demonstrated through our data that BSAs are
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more likely to form in countries with higher inflation rates, it is plausible that
BSAs do not form in highly developed countries where China does not have a
comparative advantage since those countries may not require a bilateral currency
swap agreement with China since China is at a comparative disadvantage in that
market. In developing countries – where China is investing in primary industries,
there may be a negative relationship due to these countries being unable to
participate in a bilateral currency swap due to weak financial capacity. However,
further examination beyond the scope of this study would be required to confirm
this theory. Conversely, trade plays a more significant role in the formation of a
clearing center than investment. To elaborate, holding all else constant, a one
percent increase in Chinese trade in proportion to the ith country’s GDP increases
the likelihood of a clearing center within the ith country by .27%. While a small
percentage, the positive influence of trade on the formation of a clearing center
could point towards how China is utilizing its massive export-based economy to
catalyze the process of RMB internationalization, as was discussed in detail in
Stanley et al. (2018) and Chueng (2015). Overall, the potential negative influence
of investment on the formation of BSAs and the positive influence of trade on
clearing center formation offers valuable insight into how China may utilize its
economic-political power to facilitate the process of RMB internationalization.
Additionally, China’s role in international organizations does play a role
in the spread of RMB. The final variables of interest in the realm of political
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power concern the spread of RMB through China’s international organizations,
particularly, the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). To begin with the
OBOR’s effects on BSA formation, a country within the One Belt One Road
initiative is 72.28% more likely to enter into a BSA with China, holding all else
constant. Such a high percentage is supported by Li and Taube’s (2019) theories
on the implications of the OBOR initiative in regards to RMB
internationalization. The authors discuss how OBOR trade expansion and RMB
internationalization are mutually reinforcing, since allowing for
internationalization offers protection from exchange rate risk as a country’s trade
value with China grows. For clearing centers, however, the estimated effect of the
One Belt One Road initiative was also positive but not as strong. Holding all else
constant, a country participating in the OBOR initiative increased the likelihood
of a clearing center forming by 16.12%. Again, the positive effect of the OBOR
may be due to countries looking to mitigate their exchange rate risk and facilitate
trade settlements with China as trade between the two countries grows. However,
there is evidence that suggests that China may be a bit more selective with
clearing centers than bilateral swap agreements, as was demonstrated by the
positive estimated coefficients concerning financial freedom. This line of thought
may indicate that a nation may require a developed financial sector to receive a
clearing center. In other words, developing countries in the OBOR may not have
the financial capacity to maintain an RMB clearing center. Even so, further
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research that accounts for a nuanced examination of the capabilities of a country’s
financial system is required to provide greater evidence to these suspicions.
Limitations on Regressions

Our study, while utilizing a wide array of data, was limited in a few
regards. To begin, some variables measuring critical components of a country fell
as insignificant or may not have been included in the study. For instance, OECD,
which accounted for whether a country’s economy is a member of the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), was incorporated
into this study to examine whether a country’s status as “developed” would help
or hurt the spread of RMB within its borders. However, the variable was found to
be insignificant in both equations. Yet, this does not mean that the economic
development of a country or its wealth is unimportant to the process of RMB
internationalization. Given more time and greater resources, a future study could
incorporate more factors of development and wealth, such as median income,
GDP per capita, or potentially the GINI index of inequality which would likely
offer more valuable insights about the influence of wealth and inequality in the
spread of RMB. There are endless potential contributors to the process of RMB
on a variety of metrics, some of which could be extremely powerful and
significant to the process of internationalization. While we encourage the
investigation of RMB internationalization on all metrics, the limitations of this

49

study prevent us from examining such a wide array of possible indexes and
metrics. It is also important to recall, as discussed in the previous section, that our
data suffers from serial correlation due to the nature of data used for our
dependent variables. Next, we acknowledge the shorter time frame of our study.
Unfortunately, due to how recent RMB internationalization is as a concept, annual
data was limited to the ten years between 2008 to 2018. Finally, the use of our
two regressions with and without fixed effects only captures a small glimpse into
the bigger picture of RMB internationalization. While our study’s resources did
not allow for a diverse array of regressions, future studies should consider
utilizing multiple regressions on a wide variety of metrics to better understand the
processes behind the spread of the RMB. Overall, while our study was not
without certain shortcomings, we do believe it offers indications into some of the
nuances of currency internationalization.

SECTION VI: CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this analysis, we discovered through our empirical examination of the
internationalization of the RMB that political factors weigh heavily on the RMB’s
progress towards becoming a reserve currency. While traditional economic factors
such as liberalized markets and financial stability did play a role in the process of
internationalization, our study offers evidence to stress the importance of politics
in developing an international currency. This is first supported by some of the

50

theories reviewed as well, specifically the works of Cohen (2018) and McDowell
(2019) who argue that financial statecraft and diplomacy may allow a currency to
internationalize without the issuing country meeting conventional requirements
for its internal economic climate. In our regression analysis, we found that OBOR
membership and trade with China as a proportion of GDP were two of the
stronger determinants for both Bilateral Swap Agreements and Clearing Centers.
However, it is possible that causation could go in either direction for these
variables, warranting further investigation in future research. Furthermore,
countries with high levels of financial and investment freedom were more likely
to host a BSA or clearing center while China’s scores in these areas were found to
be insignificant in all equations. As our data section showed, the lack of
variability within China-specific variables likely leads to the explanation as to
why these scores are insignificant. While the insignificance of the China-specific
variables does not allow us to make any conclusions, the estimated results from
the scores of other countries hint towards evidence of the “sword and shield”
approach to financial statecraft demonstrated within our data. Lastly, we
discovered evidence of China investing in riskier economies through our inflation
variable. This variable demonstrated an increased likelihood of a BSA or Clearing
Center in nations with higher inflation rates. This could offer support to theories
that China may be leaning towards a lender of last resort policy as both a political
move and to spread the RMB to potential debtors.

51

However, some of the economic characteristics did play a vital role in
determining the spread of RMB. For instance, China’s Business Freedom Index
score played a significant role in estimating the presence of a BSA or a clearing
center in the ith country. This could indicate that China has not been able to
entirely circumvent traditional economics to internationalize the RMB and that
the characteristics of the Chinese market are still important to the equation.
Additionally, the study of RMB internationalization is still relatively new. As a
result, data on the spread of the RMB is somewhat limited. Because of this, our
study needed to utilize the characteristics of RMB internationalization rather than
empirical measurements of currency reserves or the use of RMB in trade
settlements. Moreover, a potential weakness of this study is the relatively small
number of variables used to represent each of the three factors suspected of
driving RMB adoption. As discussed earlier, many more indexes and economic
measurements should be included in future studies to more accurately gauge the
importance of each of the three characteristics in international currency. This
could offer a more insightful outlook on the impact politics has had on the
internationalization of the RMB relative to the domestic and international
economic characteristics of China and the world. Also, the use of fixed effects in
a binary logistic model that uses panel data presents challenges in gathering
estimates. Finally, future studies are recommended to apply more advanced
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statistical techniques to address violations of classical econometric assumptions in
similar models.
While there is still much research to be done on the internationalization of
the RMB and how it spreads, this article aims to stress the importance of political
power in the creation of international currencies. We argue that while China’s
economy may possess economic inefficiencies that hinder the international
growth of the RMB, political power appears to allow China to overcome some of
the economic inadequacies of its domestic capital markets and continue the
process of internationalizing the RMB. In brief, the results of this study suggest
that future analyses in the realm of international finance and the study of RMB
internationalization should incorporate measures of political power and financial
statecraft in models of currency internationalization.
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